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 ABSTRACT 
 
Is a European Social union desirable? And is it feasible? Many politicians are skeptic about this issue. 
In this paper we turn to normative political philosophy in order to dismiss this skepticism. We show 
that arguments in favor of the implementation of egalitarian social justice at a national scale can be 
expanded to supranational institutions like the EU. Also, we argue that, ultimately, justice should be 
cosmopolitan. Theories of cosmopolitan justice already set an agenda for Europe. Moreover, the EU 
could develop its own legitimacy by convincing its citizens of the importance of the public goods it 
provides. Feasibility constraints play an important role in the reflection on how social justice should 
be implemented at the European level. Although there are clear advantages in organizing forms of 
interindividual redistribution within the EU, we suggest that, for the following years, Europe should 
rather focus on the expansion of social investment in the enhancement of the basic capabilities of the 
poorest European citizens.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many politicians are skeptic about the desirability and feasibility of a European Social Union (ESU). 
The aim of this paper is to see whether we can find strong enough counterarguments to dismiss this 
skepticism. First, we will turn to the specifically ethical discussion about this issue. It is surprising 
that normative political philosophers did not pay more attention to the question of what justice 
could mean for supranational organizations like the European Union. Probably this is a consequence 
of the fact that this discipline is dominated by Anglo-Saxon philosophers who tend to be euro-
skeptical. We think that three strategies can be followed in order to prove the necessity of the 
development of a ESU. (1) One can show that arguments in favor of the implementation of (more) 
just institutions on a national scale can be expanded to supranational levels like the EU. (2) One can 
show that theories of cosmopolitan justice apply all the more at the European level. (3) Moreover 
we will argue that the EU already provides an important range of public goods to its citizens and that 
it could expand this offer considerably by developing a social union. Also, feasibility constraints play 
an important role in the reflection on how social justice should be implemented at the European 
level. Although there are clear advantages in organizing forms of interindividual redistribution within 
the EU, we suggest that, for the following years, Europe should rather focus on the expansion of 
social investment in the enhancement of the basic capabilities of the poorest European citizens. 
2. STRONG SKEPTIC ARGUMENTS 
European and national policy makers are often rather negative about the development of a genuine 
European Social Union. Many of them favor a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and income 
within the European Union, but it is considered to be improbable that national states will ever 
transfer social competences to supra-national institutions. Three types of arguments for this position 
have been given in recent years.  
First of all, skeptics have argued that, historically, the basic rationale behind the European 
construction has been quite different. Indeed, the founding fathers of the EU had primarily a political 
and an economic aim. After two world wars visionary politicians wanted to establish a lasting peace 
in Europe. However, instead of engaging directly into a political union, they have started up various 
forms of economic cooperation, hoping that economic success would force politicians to agree on 
common political institutions. At the background, there was the idea of ‘le doux commerce’, that 
dates back from the eighteenth century. Montesquieu and the early proponents of economic 
liberalism thought that war is destructive for all participants, including for the winners. Hence it is 
better, and mutually advantageous, to engage in trade relations. This idea had been declared 
obsolete in the first half of the twentieth century by theorists stating that capitalism inevitably leads 
to imperialist wars, but the founders of the European Community for Coal and Steel have resumed 
the more optimistic stance. More than half a century later, we see that European leaders have 
repeated the same strategy time and again: they engage into economic reforms and they bet that 
the necessary institutional reforms will be agreed upon subsequently. With the introduction of a 
common currency for example, they have created ‘un fait accompli’, knowing that the sustainability 
of the euro depends on the development of new and far reaching forms of coordination of national 
economic policies. And indeed, until a few years ago, it was hardy imaginable that the budgets of the 
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member states of the Eurozone would be closely monitored by the European Commission, as is now 
the case. However, the primary goal of the EU hitherto has been economic growth as a means for 
peace-building rather than social progress. 
Secondly, there is the evident problem concerning the democratic legitimacy of institutional reforms 
that are primarily imposed by economic necessities. Here, the spectre of an irresistible European 
technocracy lurks behind the corner. For a long time the subsidiarity principle has been considered 
to be the corner stone of the European construction. What can be done efficiently at a lower level 
should not be taken over by higher levels of decision making. Policies decided within smaller 
communities suit the preferences of the citizens better and it is easier to organize a public debate on 
their shape. However, when the European Commission and its administration control member 
states, especially those belonging to the Euro zone, in order to avoid excessive budget deficits or 
unbalanced external trade relations, this is a highly centralized procedure. Probably these external 
controls help to impose some discipline to national politicians who are inclined to overspend or who 
are too much myopic, and in this way they contribute to the general interest of national societies. 
Questions arise however about how far and how deep these central controls can go. The definition 
of a minimal pension age, labor market policies, the generosity of the allocation of social security 
benefits, the performance of the education system: all this has definitely an influence on budget 
deficits. Is this a sufficient justification for Europe to aim at a harmonization of policies in all these 
spheres? One of the strong arguments in favor of a European Social Union is precisely that this is an 
indispensable precondition for the preservation of the economic and monetary union2. The problem 
is that such a policy orientation would probably enhance the (perception of a) ‘democratic deficit’ 
within Europe. 
A third objection against the implementation of something like a European Social Union states that it 
would disturb the generally accepted division of labor between national and European levels of 
decision making. The idea is that Europe’s primary function is to boost economic growth by 
expanding and deepening the common market. National authorities can then decide to tax away 
part of this additional wealth and spend the money for poverty relief or for redistribution. Hence the 
European Union provides the economic ‘infrastructure’ for a more generous social policy at the 
national level without having to develop a social policy at its own level. Not just political leaders, but 
also trade unions and associations of employers agree that social policy is and has to remain a 
national competence. This is the reason why even trade union leaders object against the imposition 
by European instances of (nationally defined) standards of minimum income or minimum wage. 
Another example: even a modest project granting some European subsidies to NGO’s distributing 
food to the poorest – substituting for the allocation of food surpluses to food banks – has recently 
been rejected unanimously by all European prime ministers. 
I think that these are the strongest objections against the development of a ESU. Their nature is 
rather political (‘realpolitik’) than ethical. However, they prevent us from developing wild utopias. 
                                                                
 
2 Frank Vandenbroucke, Europe: The Social Challenge – Defining the Union’s social objective is a necessity 
rather than a luxury, Opinion Paper Observatoire social européen, N° 11, July 2012. 
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Proposals for a ESU should definitely take into account these counterarguments. ‘Ought implies can’ 
is an important rule in ethics although pragmatic considerations should not be used to completely 
stifle institutional imagination. These skeptic considerations are however not the final word on the 
issue of the European Social Union. For a long time national states have derived their legitimacy 
from their ability to shield off their citizens from the most disruptive fluctuations of the market. 
Globalization has not just created more wealth, but also new risks and it has undermined the 
capacity of states to protect their citizens. One could have expected Europe to take over this 
function and to fulfill it in a more efficient way, but this is certainly not the perception of what really 
has happened. Organizing the expansion of the common market, Europe has been seen as part of 
the problem, rather than as its solution. The debates on social dumping illustrate this point. Giving 
substantial content to the European Social Union could remedy the failure of national states to 
efficiently regulate international markets and to organize the protection of its most vulnerable 
members. European institutions have partly moved in this direction for instance with the 
implementation of anti-discriminatory policies and the development of regional funds. Moreover, as 
the reference to the horrors of past wars inevitably loses its force in the course of time, what Europe 
needs in order to mobilize popular support, energy and imagination is a future-oriented project, the 
sense of a common purpose. Beyond debates on incremental changes there is a need for a more 
fundamental normative discussion on the goals of the EU. Hence the urgency of a reflection on what 
values like solidarity and justice could mean for Europe. 
3. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE 
An extensive literature on theories of justice has been developed since Rawls’ seminal work on this 
issue3. Rawls aims at elaborating a normative theory of justice that can be endorsed by people 
sharing a democratic and broadly egalitarian ethos. He thinks society consists of a variety of social 
positions. Each social position defines a set of rights and obligations. Together, all these social 
positions define the basic structure of society. Its fundamental features are supposed to be 
organized at the constitutional level and this is precisely the focus of Rawls’ work. Unavoidably, 
some of these social positions yield more privileges than others. This makes the definition of these 
social positions and of the basic structure of a society a very delicate matter. Now Rawls offers a 
contractualist method in order to determine what social justice basically means. A just social order is 
one that rational and reasonable citizens would choose under more or less ideal circumstances. This 
means: we should avoid that people’s conception of justice would be biased by their personal 
interests. Therefore, they should develop their ideas on social justice from a more or less detached 
point of view. This is what Rawls calls the original position. He invites all citizens to develop the 
principles that should govern a just society behind a veil of ignorance. Everybody should put 
between brackets his actual position in society. People should imagine that they possibly could be 
amongst the worst off members of society as well as amongst the more privileged ones.  
                                                                
 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971. 
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Rawls presumes that rational and reasonable citizens would be prudent enough to make the 
situation of the worst off as good as possible. Hence he thinks that they would agree with his famous 
three principles of justice. First of all, people should be allotted the most extensive set of equal civil 
rights (translating human rights). Moreover, inequality of wealth and income is only permitted (1) if 
all positions in society are open to all its members on conditions of fair equality of opportunity (for 
equal competence) and (2) if this inequality is maximally advantageous to the worst off members of 
society (the difference principle). This last principle is justified because in a society with equal civil 
rights and equal opportunities the most attractive social positions will still be occupied by those who 
are favored by accidental factors: the genetic lottery, the family in which they are born, the absence 
of serious forms of brute bad luck… In a just society one should compensate for these factors that 
are beyond individual responsibility. However, Rawls’ theory of justice is egalitarian, but not naïve. 
He accepts that individual effort should be rewarded. His theory is responsibility-sensitive. Also he 
takes seriously the leveling down objection: it is not good to condemn everybody to poverty in order 
to achieve equality. The ultimate objective of a just society is that the situation of the worst off is 
(maximally) improved. If equality kills the motivation to work, then we risk to divide evenly poverty 
instead of wealth. Hence some inequality can be justified by considerations of economic efficiency.  
According to Rawls, justice is the first virtue of social institutions. This statement is not as innocent 
as it may seem. It drastically restricts the scope of the theory of justice. It means that claims of 
justice do not impose themselves on individual motivations, nor do they arise within families or 
beyond the borders of a particular state. Rawls distrusts theories of global justice. He thinks that 
they are a kind of ideological coverage hiding the interests of global capitalism, keen to make profit 
on a worldwide basis4. He is convinced that, even in a globalized world, the fate of individuals is still 
mainly determined by their place in the national division of labor. This relates to Rawls’ 
cooperativism. Rawls describes society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. Cooperation 
and division of labor yield gains in productivity, and hence a cooperative surplus. The problem of 
distributive justice crops up when these economic agents have to divide up the proceeds of their 
cooperation. When some participants to the production process feel that they are exploited, they 
will raise a claim of justice. Rawls believes that the networks within which social wealth is produced, 
what we have called the ‘basic structure’, are mainly national. David Miller has defended a similar 
position: as people tend to compare their own situation especially with the situation of co-citizens, 
claims of justice and redistributive endeavors are mainly restricted to the realm of national states5. 
Rules of justice regulate the appropriation of the wealth created within a particular society. Of 
course, this is a highly controversial matter, loaded with conflict.  
Towards the end of his life Rawls has explained his theory of international justice in a small booklet 
on The Law of Peoples6. Again he uses the device of an original position. However the participants to 
the (hypothetical) debate on international justice are not individual human beings, but 
                                                                
 
4 John Rawls & Philippe Van Parijs, Three Letters on the Law of peoples and the European Union, in Autour de 
Rawls, Special Issue of Revue de Philosophie Economique, Vol. 8, 2003, p. 7-20.  
5 David Miller, Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 1999, p. 18.  
6 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1999. 
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representatives of the various political states in the world. Again, during the deliberation about a 
just world order, they should forget about the size of the population and the relative strength of the 
people they represent, the extent of its natural resources and the level of its development. 
According to Rawls, liberal and decent peoples would not aim at distributive justice – that is an 
internal matter of separate states – but rather at a peaceful world order. Hence they would agree on 
the ordinary principles of international law: respect for national sovereignty, compliance to 
international treaties and agreements, non-intervention in other states, war can only be justified in 
case of external aggression, ius in bello, etc. The only originality of Rawls’ principles is that he 
accepts the possibility of humanitarian interventions in other states in case of permanent and severe 
violations of human rights. Also Rawls accepts a duty of assistance to extremely poor countries, but 
only for the sake of the preservation of peace, i.e. only up to the point where these countries 
become able to sustain decently just institutions.  
Rawls’ refusal to aim at distributive justice on a global scale has been heavily contested by other 
political philosophers and ethicists. Also, many disciples of Rawls were disappointed by Rawls’ 
severe restriction of the scope of the theory of justice. Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz for example 
have argued that globalization has made the fate of people and communities all over the world 
dependent on regulations on trade, finance and quality standards, defined by international 
institutions that are heavily dominated by the interests of wealthy people and nations7. The 
expansion of the world market has rendered obsolete the idea that the basic structure would still be 
predominantly national. Arguably this is even more the case with the European Union. The jobs and 
expectations of so many people in Europe depend on decisions of the European Central Bank, the 
European Court of Justice, the European Commission and the Council of ministers. Moreover, free 
trade reigns within Europe and it are mainly European institutions that regulate competition, that 
prevent the creation of monopolies and oligopolies, that control banks and other financial 
institutions. Hence Rawls’ principles of justice should apply not only to the internal affairs of 
separate states, but also to the whole of the European Union. This means: a policy stimulating 
economic growth by liberating the markets of goods, services, capital and labor can only be justified 
if it contributes maximally to the improvement of the situation of those who are worst off within 
Europe. If, according to Pogge and Beitz, Rawls’ principles of justice, and especially the difference 
principle, should apply to the whole world, then definitely, we can say that they should also apply to 
the European Union.  
But what would this mean exactly? Concerning Rawls’ first principle, one can argue that the respect 
for fundamental human rights has already been secured on a much firmer basis than under the old 
exclusively national legal systems by the creation of the European Court of Justice and of other legal 
institutions with transnational competence. European citizens who think that they have been 
treated unjustly by national courts of justice or who complain about discriminatory policies can 
appeal to European institutions to claim their rights. Also, Europe has created a large territory where 
                                                                
 
7 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights - Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2002. 
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 2nd ed. , Princeton University Press, 1999. 
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free movement of persons and of employees prevails (under certain conditions). Equality or 
opportunities or equal access to attractive positions for equally competent persons – Rawls’ second 
principle - has been enhanced by the Erasmus exchange program of students and teachers, and by 
the creation of transnational procedures for recognition of university degrees and competences 
obtained in another country. However much work still remains to be done in order to create real and 
not just formal equality of opportunities, also on a national scale. Now, when we try to see what the 
implementation of the difference principle on a European scale could mean, we meet an important 
dilemma. If we consider the European Union as a single economic and political unit, then the 
difference principle applies to individual persons. Hence an extensive program of interindividual 
redistribution on a European scale should be set up. In the long run, this could possibly lead to the 
creation of a European social security system. If, on the contrary, following Rawls’ suggestion in The 
Law of Peoples, we aim at international justice, also within the EU, and if we want to reserve a 
substantial domain of competences for national states, then we should take states as the basic units 
for redistribution within Europe.  
The difference between both strategies is far from being negligible. Suppose we want to develop a 
European policy concerning (the risk of) unemployment. In the first case we should aim at the 
pooling of individual risks within a system that should be funded by the contributions of all European 
citizens. In the second case solidarity is better organized between states, for instance with a Fund 
aiming at the economic development of ‘workpoor’ regions. One has argued that people are more 
prone to solidarity with other individuals than with collective entities. Therefore, we could presume 
that the first type of solidarity would be more robust than the second one. Indeed, insurance 
systems are based on more or less enlightened self-interest. Hence, like in the case of national 
systems of social security, there is a good chance that, after a while, a European system of 
unemployment insurance would acquire some form of legitimacy. The practical implication of 
interindividual redistribution between employed and unemployed persons would be that net 
transfers of wealth from rich to poor regions would take place. However, interregional redistribution 
would not be the primary aim of such a Social Europe. Transfers would quasi automatically result 
from a system that runs according to its own logic. The second strategy to build up a European Social 
Union on the contrary would depend on national transfers of wealth from rich to poor regions. This 
should be based on political decisions at the European level. Knowing what actually happens within 
Europe, these decisions would be very hard to achieve and would always be contested. Probably, 
each year again, some countries would try to renegotiate the transfers. In the end, following Mrs. 
Thatchers’ device – ‘We want our money back’ - each country would try to get back what it gives, 
and no serious redistribution would take place.  
To be honest, the first strategy would be (almost) as vulnerable as the second one. Organizing an 
insurance system covering the risk of unemployment at the European level would be especially 
attractive if the risk of unemployment were equally divided amongst individuals, regions and states. 
However, in actual reality, this is far from being the case. Some persons, especially high-skilled 
people, are convinced (rightly or wrongly) that they will never have to face a problem of 
unemployment. Others are chronically at risk of losing their job. Also, in some regions, 
unemployment is endemic, whereas in others, during long periods of time, there is no more than 
frictional unemployment. In these circumstances, it will be as difficult to establish interindividual 
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forms of redistribution as to set up intergovernmental Funds. Both will be threatened by free 
ridership. We will come back to this discussion in the final paragraph of this text. 
4. COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMANITARIANISM 
In Rawls’ conception justice is primarily an internal matter of separate peoples 8, united by common 
institutions, common sympathies and a moral conception of what a just society means. His ideas 
about the world order are much less ambitious: it should permit a great variety of societies to co-
exist peacefully under some minimal conditions. If international solidarity is needed, it can only 
impose itself between societies. This is a somewhat strange position for a liberal political 
philosopher, because we expect liberals to advocate ethical individualism, i. e. the idea that we 
should always focus on the ethical consequences of social structures and institutions on the fate of 
individuals. Rawls’ theory of domestic justice conforms to this device, but not his theory of 
international justice (and he refuses a theory of global justice). Now, against Rawls, many political 
philosophers have developed a cosmopolitan theory of justice9. According to this type of theory, 
what we owe to the global poor is defined by the principle of mutual help: we are morally obliged to 
help people in severe distress, if we can do so with relatively few costs and risks for ourselves. This is 
also the core principle of humanitarianism. It is not a minor obligation. On the contrary, it is a strong 
and urgent duty we have towards all human beings, on the basis of our common humanity, no 
matter their color, ethnic background or culture. The precise content of this duty differs however 
according to whether we give a minimal or a more expanded definition of the most basic human 
needs and rights.  
Martha Nussbaum is the most well-known advocate of cosmopolitanism10. She argues that each and 
every human being - stronger even, each and every living being – has an unconditional right to 
develop his or her basic capabilities. For human beings, she proposes an extensive list of ten basic 
capabilities. These range from the right to bodily integrity and the right not to be hungry to the right 
to form one’s own conception of the good and the right to full participation to social life. I will not 
discuss this theory in detail. What is important for us here is, first of all, that Martha Nussbaum 
presents her list as an absolute deontological constraint on all societies and institutions, and second, 
that she presents these requirements as claims of justice. In the literature this has been called a non-
relational theory of justice. Human persons have claims of justice on the very basis of their 
humanity, no matter in what relations they stand towards other human persons.  
For Nussbaum, the duties implied by her Capability Approach are quite substantial and they impose 
themselves without the slightest possibility of compromise or tradeoff. There is no hierarchy 
                                                                
 
8 Rawls speaks about ‘peoples’ rather than ‘states’ to indicate that he adheres to a normative rather than a 
realist conception of international relations. 
9 For instance Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger – An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, Allen & Unwin, 
1986 and Henry Shue, Basic Rights – Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy, University of Princeton 
Press, 1980. 
10 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006. 
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amongst the basic capabilities she enlists and she gives no indication of priorities. For instance, in 
order to permit persons with wheelchairs to have access to schools, public administration, trains and 
busses, probably huge costs should be made. These expenditures would probably not pass the 
utilitarian requirement that the utility of the whole of society should be maximized, but Nussbaum 
justifies them on the basis of her capability theory. Her list of basic capabilities goes well beyond a 
minimal agenda of human dignity as for instance defined in the Millennium Goals for Human 
Development in poor countries. It rather constitutes a normative framework that can be used as a 
standard for the evaluation of European institutions. One can argue however that the lack of 
hierarchy amongst the basic capabilities diminishes the practical usefulness of her theory and even 
that Nussbaum neglects the basic fact of scarcity11.  
Humanitarian or non-relational theories of justice define purely moral rights and duties that impose 
themselves on all human societies. Societies can respond in very different ways to the requirements 
imposed by Nussbaum’s list, but of course, we need procedures and institutions in order to create so 
called perfect rights, rights with corresponding holders of obligations. Hence, although Nussbaum’s 
theory of justice is no more than a substantial version of humanitarianism, it certainly imposes on 
European institutions an encompassing agenda in the field of poverty reduction, education and 
employment policy. Guaranteeing basic capabilities for all European citizens, even if this policy is 
justified on humanitarian grounds, is not at all a minimalistic endeavor. 
5. RELATIONAL THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
Are we first of all human beings, members of a global ‘kosmopolis’, or are we rather culturally 
embedded citizens of particular societies? Both positions have been defended by contemporary 
philosophers. With her Capability Approach, Nussbaum argues for a universal theory of the good life 
that should be sufficiently general and even vague to permit – at least in principle - a great diversity 
of human societies to gain legitimacy. Others argue for cosmopolitanism on the basis that what 
human beings have in common is much more important than what divides them. They sometimes 
refer to biological features or to the genetic endowment human beings share. Adherents to the 
phenomenological philosophical tradition on the contrary stress that we are not freewheeling spirits, 
floating above the turmoil, but that we are bodily beings, always situated on a particular place, 
against a horizon that we can never completely leave behind. Hence the requirement of absolute 
detachment from our spontaneous commitments would be impossible and even not desirable. We 
learn to develop empathic feelings towards distant others on the basis of our interactions with the 
near and dear and against a background that we can never completely objectify in a transparent 
way. 
                                                                
 
11 Amartya Sen has developed his theory of basic capabilities within a consequentialist framework that does 
admit tradeoffs. Sen refuses to establish a priori a list of basic capabilities. He thinks that each society should 
define its own priorities in a democratic political process. Compared to Nussbaum’s version of the capability 
approach, his theory loses some of its normative sharpness – politics takes priority over ethics - but it is able 
to take into account the fact that not all things that are desirable or ethically required can be realized 
immediately. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Knopf, New York, 1999. 
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Relational theories of justice are based on the idea of human persons as contextual beings and 
oppose themselves against abstract humanitarianism. They derive claims of justice from the 
particular relations people sustain with each other. We have to help the victims of a tsunami or a 
tornado because they are human persons like us, people in extreme distress. This is a strong 
humanitarian requirement. However, if it can be shown that these natural disasters are caused by 
the global warming, for which the inhabitants of the rich parts of the world have special 
responsibility, then we have an additional obligation to help, that is now based on a claim of justice 
in the strong sense of the word. Claims of justice based on relational theories of justice have to be 
justified in a public debate. They are discussed on the political forum, while humanitarian duties 
seem to have more of a moral status, preceding public debates. 
According to the relational conception, claims of justice can be founded on various types of social 
relations. As I have already explained, Rawls’ cooperativism sees the question of distributive justice 
to arise among people who cooperate in order to create a cooperative surplus that has subsequently 
to be divided up amongst the contributors. A disturbing aspect of Rawls’ cooperativism is that this 
theory seems to neglect those who for some well- or ill-founded reason are unable to cooperate for 
the production of a social surplus. I do not mean here people who are temporarily sick or those who 
got an accident during their active career, but rather people who are permanently disabled, or 
others who live in the margins of society or in the outskirts of Europe, and who are hardly integrated 
in the market economy. Doubtlessly, those people are amongst the most vulnerable citizens, but if 
one takes cooperativism literally, they have no claim of justice. Non-relational theories of justice do 
not have to face this kind of problems. Rawls himself acknowledges the problem. He seems to plead 
for an ad hoc solution, granting rights to severely disabled persons in a kind of second round, at the 
legislative stage, rather than at the constitutional level. Probably, a better way to escape to this 
problem is to appeal to another type of special relations yielding claims of justice. Maybe these 
nonproductive people do not contribute to the general welfare, but, as members of our society, they 
share with us a common history, they are subject to the same institutions, they sometimes speak the 
same language(s), and in general, they and us, we belong to the same community of fate. Belonging 
to the same community is definitely a special relation yielding particular claims of justice, next to the 
humanitarian rights all human beings already have on the basis of our common humanity. Again, the 
relevant community should not necessarily coincide with a nation state or a group sharing the same 
language. There already is a huge diversity within our contemporary (nation) states. Probably, 
cultural and linguistic heterogeneity within Europe is of the same order as within multinational 
states. Still there is also an important communality. 
Similarly one can argue that there exists a special relation between some European countries and 
their former colonies. In most cases, this common history encompasses the best and the worst: 
exploitation, oppression and cultural destruction, but also medical progress and education. The 
consequence is that, in case of serious problems, former colonizers feel responsible and people in 
former colonies look for assistance from the people with whom they share part of their history. 
Page 14 of 20 
 
 
Thomas Pogge has developed his own version of relational justice12. He argues that there is a causal 
relation between the wealth in the Northern part of the world (or in the West) and poverty in the 
South: poor people are poor because they have been exploited by rich people at the other side of 
the globe. Underdevelopment in some countries would mainly be caused by external, rather than by 
internal factors. According to Pogge, the rules of the international monetary and financial systems 
and the trade regulations on the world market systematically benefit the rich part of the world. 
Hence again, a duty for the latter to compensate for the harm caused to the poor parts of the world. 
The strength of these relational claims of justice evidently depends on the plausibility of this actual 
connection between wealth and poverty on a world scale. Loose social relations generate weaker 
claims of justice. If a country is brought to severe distress, due to a foolish internal policy conducted 
by its own president or government, we may still feel a humanitarian duty to help but there will be 
no strong duty of justice, although it could well be the case that wealthy countries have tolerated 
these greedy or even predatory leaders for some time. The relative strength of the causal nexus 
between internal and external structures and institutions, of between poverty here and wealth at 
another place in the world becomes important in this respect. It is easy to see the implications of 
Pogge’s theory for the European Union. If inequality within the EU is larger than within the US, this is 
partly due to the fact that Europe has recently accepted poor countries like Rumania and Bulgaria as 
new members of the Union. This situation creates obligations for the future, but one cannot argue 
for a strong duty of justice towards poor Rumania and Bulgaria on the basis of past harm. It can 
however be a legitimate question whether the common agricultural policy within the EU has not 
contributed to the impoverishment of small farmers. If this is a case, they can legitimately raise a 
claim of justice. 
6. FROM STATISM TO COSMOPOLITANISM 
The idea that justice is primarily a national concern and that there are no bounds of justice beyond 
national borders has not only been defended by John Rawls, but also, and on other grounds, by 
Thomas Nagel13. He advocates another version of a relational theory of justice, that we will call 
statism. According to this philosopher, people cannot live together peacefully without some coercive 
rules. Now, for a liberal, all coercion should be justified towards those who have to undergo it. In a 
liberal society citizens are forced to comply with laws. These can only be legitimate if they have been 
made (collectively) by the same citizens to which they apply. In a scheme inspired by Rousseau, 
citizens are the subjects as well as the authors of the general will. The element of coercion is 
balanced by the need for justification of the coercive laws. Of course, people can escape to legal 
coercion by emigration, but in that case, the price they have to pay for their freedom is so high that 
we can still speak of coercion. Nagel thinks that it only makes sense to speak about justice in the 
context of a national state. He sees no sovereign power equivalent to a national state on a 
transnational level. Hence, norms of social justice do not apply on a transnational level such as the 
European Union, and certainly not at the global level. 
                                                                
 
12 Thoams Pogge, op. cit.  
13 Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 2005, p. 113-47. 
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This conclusion is highly contestable. Definitely, Europe does exercise coercion on the European 
citizens, for instance recently by imposing budget cuts on national states in order to save the Euro. 
Also there is a European Parliament, where representatives of the European citizens discuss the 
appropriateness and the legitimacy of the European policies and procedures. Entrance in the 
European Union may be voluntary, members are not allowed to quit unilaterally in case of 
disagreement. If they did, we may suppose that some sanctions on behalf of the other members of 
the EU would follow. The price to pay would probably be quite high. Against Nagel, Andrea 
Sangiovanni argues that norms of social justice also apply to voluntary organizations14. The fact that, 
at the time of their entrance, new member states agree in general terms with existing European 
laws and treaties does not mean that they are not allowed anymore to criticize in the name of social 
justice some of the European policies.  
I think Sangiovanni is right in this, but it does not matter so much for our discussion here. National 
states within the EU do not have full sovereignty anymore. In classical political theory, sovereignty 
was a yes-or-no question, not a matter of degree. Within Europe, it may still be the case that 
national states have the power to decide in exceptional circumstances (the Carl Schmitt criterion), 
but in many realms European law now has priority on national law. Also within federal states like 
Belgium there is no clear hierarchy between state and substate law. Sovereignty is divided among 
many instances. The dual role of members of communities, who are at the same time submitted to 
coercion and who can ask for its justification, is not anymore the monopoly of national states. Hence 
Nagel’s theory offers no principled objection against a European Social Union aiming at social justice.  
Philippe Van Parijs has argued that also at the global level, there are coercive rules and there is a 
nascent public opinion, organized by NGO’s and asking for the justification of international trade 
regulations or of the barriers against migration of poor people to more wealthy countries15. Hence, 
both Nagel’s criteria apply and – contrary to his own thesis - it does make sense to aim at global 
justice. According to Van Parijs, there is a horizon where relational and non-relational theories of 
justice meet. Actually the world is so much united by globalization that almost all human beings have 
been submitted to the same rules of the world market and of some regulatory institutions. Of 
course, a special relation with almost all human beings is not so special anymore. The fact that, 
ultimately, all human beings – except perhaps a tiny minority - depend on the same institutions can 
be defined as a special relation, but probably, the bounds of justice this situation yields are weaker 
than the claims based on dependence on national or European institutions.  
Philippe Van Parijs’ plea for a basic income refers to this point where relational and non-relational 
theories of justice, cosmopolitanism and theories of global interdependence, meet. Ultimately, we 
are all human beings and we should aim at global justice. Each and every human being, by the very 
fact that he is born, has a right to his share of the natural resources of the earth, a right to his part of 
                                                                
 
14 Andrea Sangiovanni, Solidarity in the European Union: Problems and Prospects, in Dickson, J. Eleftheriadis, P. 
(eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
15 Philippe Van Parijs, International Distributive justice, in R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit, T. Pogge, The Blackwell 
Companion to Political Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, Vol. II, p. 638-52.  
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the inherited wealth, accumulated through history and more generally, a right to compensation for 
the appropriation of scarce attractive social resources and positions by a restricted group of 
people16. However, Van Parijs accepts this as a long term goal. We should not aim at a general tabula 
rasa of all actual states and social institutions, but we should rather expand the existing patterns of 
redistribution and solidarity. The implementation of a Eurodividend, as a supplement to national 
systems of social security, should be seen as a first step towards a global basic income. Probably for 
a very long time the global basic income would be much lower than the Eurodividend and national 
systems of social security would still be more generous, but the general direction of what we should 
aim at is clear. 
7. THE PUBLIC GOOD ARGUMENT 
Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism justifies a strong agenda for a social policy at the European level, but is 
not very specific – it applies equally to the whole world - and it gives no indication of where 
European policy makers should start. Rawls’ and Nagel’s arguments for the implementation of social 
justice at a national level are not so destructive for the possibility of something like a European 
Social Union as both philosophers seem to think themselves. Still we lack a strong positive argument 
in favor of the definition of social justice as the common purpose of the European Union. Maybe the 
public good argument could be a plausible candidate for this task. The idea is that the European 
Union provides all of its members with a range of public goods. We have already hinted at some of 
these goods like internal peace-keeping and additional economic growth. Also the European Union 
can have more influence on the international scene than in case national states would act 
separately. How to stop global warming? How to tackle global environmental problems? How to 
stop the importation of meat treated with hormones or antibiotics without being sued for 
international courts of justice for violation of the principles of free trade? How to regulate 
international financial markets? Can we organize a Tobin Tax? In all these fields transferring national 
competences to the European level is more efficient. 
Some advantages of the European union are quite obvious. Although the euro at a certain moment 
has been in great danger, we can hardly imagine having to return to a situation where we have to 
exchange money when we travel to Paris or Amsterdam. Queuing at border controls within Europe 
already seems to belong to a distant past, although we sometimes wish that gangsters could be 
stopped at the borders of our country. Other advantages are less visible. The creation of a wide 
unified economic territory permits a more efficient taxation of income from capital. The imposition 
of European norms of good governance on governments stimulates national politicians to better 
serve the general interest of their country. Europe makes it easier to organize counter powers 
against monopolistic tendencies of some multinationals. Europe can promote some beneficial social 
models: states combining high levels of productivity and economic growth with high levels of 
taxation and solidarity perform better than states with low levels of economic growth and taxation 
                                                                
 
16 Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford University Press, 
1995.  
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and a poor organization of social security. Some public goods Europe provides implicitly have a social 
impact. The question is whether the public goods argument can also justify a more explicit 
development of a ESU. 
The problem with public goods is however that they are always vulnerable to free ridership: member 
states wanting to profit maximally from common provisions without fair contribution. There is a 
huge literature on how to limit free ridership. Organizing more transparency about the advantages 
of European membership is certainly important. It should be made clear that Europe can enhance 
the domestic problem solving capacity, for instance by pooling the risk of being subjected to 
asymmetric external shocks. From an ethical perspective the fairness principle is important in this 
respect. We know that, in common life, most people are willing to cooperate for a common purpose, 
at least when they know that most others will join them in this effort. The idea is that each 
beneficiary should equally participate in a common venture. At the background is the idea of 
reciprocity, which is the most basic social norm in common life. Those who want to profit from 
cooperation should also contribute to it. This form of cooperative justice is close to the Rawlsian 
cooperativism we have described above, but while Rawls stresses the claims of justice that each 
participant can derive from his cooperative effort, here the emphasis lies on the duty of all 
beneficiaries of the cooperation to contribute in a fair manner.  
Empirical research learns that the fairness principle constitutes a powerful motivation for individuals 
to avoid free ridership and to engage in loyal cooperation. It is less obvious that it works equally well 
in intergovernmental negotiations in the Council of ministers. Now, The main reason why the 
provision of public goods within Europe in general, and the development of a ESU in particular, is so 
difficult seems to be the lack of a common ethos amongst European citizens and politicians. 
Solidarity is the key value in this respect. Definitely, we have found good ethical arguments in favor 
of a ESU. However the lack of solidarity within Europe is supposed to seriously hamper the feasibility 
of this kind of reform. 
8. SOLIDARITY 
Solidarity can be defined as the willingness to share with others we do not know personally, but with 
whom we identify on the basis of some form of communality. Solidarity defines a we-feeling. It is a 
transposition of the third value of the French revolution – fraternity - to the era of masses, to the 
realm of anonymous social relations. It refers to the idea that we are all children of the same father 
and hence, it presupposes a sense of equality. Solidarity amongst wage laborers is the classical 
example. Here the communality is formed by the fact that workers or employees occupy the same 
structural position within a capitalist society. At the most abstract level we can develop empathic 
feelings with all fellow human beings. However, in actual reality, solidarity seems to flourish better 
on the basis of more particularistic features. Also ascriptive features like race, religion, common 
language or nationality seem to work better as criteria of identification than common projects. 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism is fine, but probably, it defines a form of identity that is too 
abstract or too much intellectualist to mobilize European citizens.  
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Doubtlessly, solidarity can be instrumental in limiting the temptation of free ridership. The 
important question is whether it is indispensable for the construction of some form of ESU. 
Communitarian and liberal political philosophers have different opinions about this issue. The latter 
think that spontaneous feelings of solidarity have no normative weight and that, if they have not 
been the subject of thorough reflection, they can even be dangerous in some contexts17, while the 
former are convinced that ultimately, ethical motivations have no other basis than the common 
understandings and intuitions of actual people with their particular attachments18. Ultimately, this is 
not just a matter of general principles. Two strategies have been defended for Europe. Many opinion 
leaders are convinced that we need a strong common identity in order to advance in the direction of 
a ESU. Also they point at the evidence that heterogeneous societies tend to have less generous 
systems of social security: no serious redistribution without a strong we-feeling. Hence, they are 
convinced that Europe will never be able to develop into more than a free trade zone. Others think 
that it is not impossible that the creation of new or expanded redistributive mechanisms at the 
European level would generate its own cultural presuppositions, i.e. the ethos that is needed to 
sustain these institutions. Still this remains a wager. Also, it is not clear whether the introduction of 
more democracy in Europe would stimulate the development of a ESU, or whether it would rather 
sharpen nationalist sensibilities. Probably some institutional engineering can be helpful in this 
respect, for instance with the organization of the election of European MP’s by a Europe wide 
constituency. However, the question how far a common ethos can be produced by institutional 
reforms is not really decided. Probably it is even not decidable because too much context 
dependent. 
It is clear that, in actual reality, the sense of a European identity is less developed than feelings of 
national adherence. However, pluralism and multiculturalism have also become the common reality 
within our so-called national states. In this situation Europessimism could easily yield a more general 
pessimism on the future of redistributive welfare states. Now, despite all pluralism, surveys clearly 
show that most Europeans, at least in the old European countries, do share some common values: 
precisely these values backing our welfare states. We are convinced that the existence of strong 
welfare states is what distinguish us from the US and most of us are proud on that. If Europe wants 
to develop a common purpose, definitely, it has to develop into a social union, not as a competitor 
with existing national welfare states, but rather in order to strengthen distributive justice. In this 
respect what we do together is probably more important than all references to common values, 
heritage and history. Hence again, the importance of the creation of public goods. 
 
 
                                                                
 
17 See Brian Barry’s discussion of Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice in Columbia Law Review, April 1984, Vol. 
84 (3), p. 806-815. 
18 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p. 9 and 
passim. 
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9. BASIC INCOME OR SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
As we already have mentioned, the European Union already produces an important range of public 
goods. However the public good argument stays relatively general as long as we do not specify how 
it can justify a European Social Union. Here we have to turn back to the analysis of the actual 
political problems of the EU that we have sketched in the beginning of this text. One of the main 
arguments in favor of a European Social Union is that it is necessary in order to obtain a more 
smoothly functioning economic and monetary union. In this respect, several authors have suggested 
that Europe should look at how the United States has succeeded in solving the problem of 
maintaining a monetary union between states with varying economic development19. There are two 
remarkable differences. First of all, in the US, there is large interstate migration. When the car 
industry in Detroit closes down, many people move out to another, more flourishing state. Within 
Europe on the contrary, linguistic barriers considerably limit migration between member states. 
Moreover, here, migration is seen as a threat to national welfare states. There is a second inbuilt 
stabilizer of the social and economic system of the United States. Federal authorities have organized 
and funded a system of interpersonal redistribution. Social security in the US may be less generous 
than in our European welfare states, transfers from wealthy to poor states, organized via systems of 
interpersonal redistribution, are considerable, if we compare them with what we have in the 
European Union. Also migration is less a threat if social security programs are organized at a central 
level. Centralization of insurance devices is more efficient. In this case the subsidiarity principle does 
not lead to decentralization.  
The American example shows that Europe could gain in terms of economic stability and political 
legitimacy by organizing a Social Union. However, there are many obstacles. We have already 
mentioned the reluctance of governments and social actors to engage into this direction. Stimulating 
the development of a systematic anti-poverty and employment policy in the various European 
countries by way of the open coordination method may be too soft, but it has some merits: it shows 
clearly where policies fail and that it contributes to spread good practices. The introduction of a 
European minimum wage, although different in each country, would be a modest step in the good 
direction. Currently it is on the European agenda, but it will be hard to get it approved by the various 
member states. 
Note that many problems of the EU stem from the recent expansion of the Union. The conditions for 
admission to the Union were much tougher for the first countries that wanted to join, than for their 
successors. Originally the idea was that a country could only enter into the Union, on condition that 
it had gone through a series of structural reforms. Countries had to successfully modernize their 
economy before being admitted. Entrance in the Union opened the prospect of strong local 
economic growth and progress. Hence migration pressure remained limited. Recently however, 
                                                                
 
19 Bea Cantillon and Frank Vandenbroucke (eds.), Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction. How successful are 
European welfare states?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Philippe Van Parijs, The Problem of Inequality Today. A quasi-American Strategy for European Egalitarians?, 
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countries have been admitted for political reasons more than on the basis of their economic record. 
I am not sure that the development of a EU with variable geometry can solve this kind of problems. 
Doubtlessly, it would be easier (but also less generous and less urgent from an ethical point of view) 
to construct a social union with countries that have already a comparable level of economic 
development. 
Now, if we want more transfers between the European member states, should we organize this on 
an interpersonal or on an international basis? As we have already mentioned, there are some clear 
arguments in favor of interpersonal redistribution. It is perceived as more legitimate than interstate 
transfers that have to be decided on a yearly basis by politicians bargaining in order ‘to get their 
money back’. Also, interpersonal systems of redistribution on the basis of insurance mechanisms or 
the organization of a Eurodividend, Philippe Van Parijs’ proposal, would make quite visible the 
advantages of membership of the EU. I tend to favor an alternative and less spectacular proposal, 
namely the increase of European investments enhancing the capabilities of poor people. My 
inspiration comes from the theory of economic development. Here you find the following classical 
problem: What should a poor country do in case it gets a windfall profit, a huge amount of money 
falling from heaven? The opening of a diamond mine in the desert of Botswana is an often quoted 
example20. The bad way to proceed is to spend the money for consumption, to subsidize bread or 
oil, or to give additional income to part or all of its citizens. Sound policy on the contrary is to use the 
money for investment.  
To some extent, this is what Europe has done in the recent past with regional and structural Funds. 
The amounts of money spent are not huge – the European budget is limited – but nevertheless, 
transfers to countries like Bulgaria and Rumania represent 3 to 4 % of their GDP. Also, most public 
investments in poor European member states are currently funded by the EU. Many of these 
investments concern the construction of roads, opening distant regions to markets. Improving 
market access is appropriate in a project that focuses on stimulating economic growth and direct or 
indirect job creation. However new Funds could be created for more direct forms of social 
investment focusing on the improvement of education systems, health care and access to labor 
markets. This could be a project that is not overly ambitious, but also not unfeasible.  
 
                                                                
 
20 World Development Report 2001, Attacking Poverty, World Bank Washington. 
